The Alternative for Germany (AfD) is approaching a potentially historic breakthrough in Saxony-Anhalt, where it is projected to win about 42% of the vote. If it secures an outright parliamentary majority, the party could lead a German state for the first time since the end of World War II.
Although the election is formally a state contest, its consequences would extend far beyond regional politics. A victory would give the AfD control over important areas of State Policy, including education, policing, asylum administration and elements of domestic intelligence. It would also provide the party with a governing platform from which to demonstrate whether its nationalist programme can move from opposition rhetoric into institutional practice.
The election has therefore become a test not only of Germany’s democratic “firewall” against the far right, but also of the AfD’s foreign-policy identity. The party seeks closer relations with Russia, opposes further military assistance to Ukraine and supports restoring economic links with Moscow. At the same time, it has cultivated relationships with Donald Trump’s political movement and selectively praised the former US president’s approach to migration and national sovereignty.
The result is an ideological position that attempts to stand between Washington and Moscow while claiming that Germany should subordinate neither its security policy to the United States nor its economic interests to European sanctions. The party calls this independence. Its critics see a dangerous mixture of transactional nationalism, pro-Kremlin sympathies and hostility to Germany’s postwar alliances.
An Election With National Consequences
Saxony-Anhalt is one of Germany’s eastern states, with a population of roughly two million people and just under 1.8 million eligible voters. The AfD’s projected support represents a dramatic increase from the 20.8% it received in the previous state election in 2021. The CDU, by contrast, is polling at approximately 22–23%, leaving the AfD with a lead of almost 20 percentage points.
The electoral arithmetic is crucial. Germany’s 5% threshold can exclude smaller parties from parliament, allowing the largest party to convert a substantial vote share into a disproportionately large number of seats. If the Left, SPD, Greens or other smaller parties fail to clear the threshold, the AfD could come close to, or potentially reach, an absolute parliamentary majority without winning more than half of all votes.
That possibility explains why the election has attracted national and international attention. An outright majority would allow Ulrich Siegmund, the AfD’s 35-year-old lead candidate, to become the first far-right state premier in postwar German history. If the AfD remains the largest party but falls short of a majority, however, its path to government would be far less certain because all major parties continue to reject coalition cooperation with it.
The AfD’s national co-leader Alice Weidel has expressed confidence that the party will form a government in Saxony-Anhalt.
“We will form the government in Saxony-Anhalt,”
Alice Weidel said, presenting the election as the beginning of a broader march toward national power. The party’s campaign has similarly portrayed the vote as the starting point of a political transformation rather than an isolated regional contest.
The AfD’s “Germany First” Position
The AfD’s foreign policy is built around the language of national sovereignty. It rejects what it presents as Germany’s excessive dependence on Washington, Brussels and NATO policy, while arguing that Berlin should rebuild pragmatic relations with Moscow.
Ulrich Siegmund described this position in an interview:
“We’re quite transparent about saying that we want an especially good relationship with Russia, of course, but also with the United States of America, because those are simply important players in this world.”
He continued:
“We see American interests, we see Russian interests, but we have our own interest, namely the German interest.”
The statement is significant because it places the AfD outside the traditional German foreign-policy consensus. Mainstream German parties generally view the United States as a central security partner and Russia as a major security threat, particularly since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The AfD instead presents both powers as competing actors whose interests Germany should assess without permanent allegiance to either.
This rhetoric gives the party flexibility. It can appeal to voters who favour closer relations with Russia while also attracting voters who admire Trump’s resistance to liberal internationalism. It can criticise US actions when they are viewed as harmful to Germany, yet praise Trump’s political style when discussing immigration, borders and national identity.
The approach is less a coherent alliance system than a form of strategic ambiguity. The AfD wants the credibility associated with international power without accepting the obligations that accompany either a close US partnership or a relationship of accommodation with Moscow.
Trump as Model and Rival
The AfD’s connection with Trump’s political movement is visible through meetings, public contacts and shared political language. Alice Weidel met then-US Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference, while AfD politicians attended Trump’s second inauguration. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have also criticised Germany’s classification of the AfD as extremist, allowing the party to portray itself as part of a wider international nationalist movement.
The similarities between the AfD and MAGA politics are particularly strong on immigration. Markus Frohnmaier, the AfD’s foreign-policy spokesperson, described Trump’s border policy as “really impressive” and argued that Germany needs “something like ICE.” The reference to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency signals support for a more punitive and centralised approach to deportations and immigration enforcement.
Yet Frohnmaier also introduced an important qualification, saying it would be
“weird if Donald Trump would protect German interests.”
The remark captures the limits of the AfD’s relationship with Trump. The party admires his political methods and migration agenda, but it does not want to concede that American interests should take priority over German ones.
This distinction matters because Trump’s foreign-policy agenda could conflict with the AfD’s domestic economic promises. Tariffs, energy disruptions and pressure on European allies could increase costs for German businesses and households. The AfD may therefore support Trump’s nationalism in principle while opposing specific US policies that threaten German economic interests.
Almut Möller of the European Policy Centre described the ideological connection as an alignment around
“care about (its) own people,”
but cautioned that the relationship is
“not straightforward.”
Tariffs, energy prices and different national interests complicate any simple partnership between the AfD and Trump’s movement.
Putin, Russia and the Ukraine War
The AfD’s position on Russia is more consistent than its position on the United States. The party opposes further defence and military-aid packages for Ukraine, frequently describing aid for Kyiv as money that could instead be spent on German citizens. It also supports restoring economic relations with Moscow and reopening the Nord Stream pipelines.
The party’s federal programme calls for an end to German weapons deliveries to Ukraine, the removal of sanctions against Russia and negotiations that would leave Ukraine outside both NATO and the European Union. Its foreign-policy language summarises the intended hierarchy by declaring:
“The USA remains our partner. Russia should become one.”
In Saxony-Anhalt, the regional programme reportedly goes further by calling for closer economic and cultural relations with Russia and expanding Russian-language education in schools. It portrays the established parties’ “anti-Russian policy” as contrary to Germany’s interests.
The AfD’s Russia policy is partly economic and partly geopolitical. Cheap Russian gas is presented as a solution to Germany’s energy pressures, while renewed trade is framed as a way to restore industrial competitiveness. Politically, the party uses the Ukraine war to challenge the governing parties’ commitment to sanctions, military support and Germany’s strategic alignment with NATO.
The party’s officials have also made repeated trips to Moscow, St. Petersburg and occupied Crimea, visits that have raised concerns among corruption watchdogs and other observers. These activities reinforce the perception that the AfD is not simply advocating negotiations with Russia but is cultivating a political relationship with Moscow.
That perception has become more serious as Germany investigates alleged Russian hybrid activity. German authorities have accused Russia of responsibility for an attempted attack involving an explosive-laden drone at Leipzig-Halle airport, a state-owned facility in eastern Germany. The incident has added security concerns to an election already shaped by debates over Russia and Ukraine.
Strategic Ambiguity and Political Opportunity
The AfD’s balancing act works because it links three different grievances: frustration with migration, anger over the cost of the Ukraine war and distrust of Germany’s established parties. Trump is used as a symbol of border control and national assertiveness. Putin and Russia are used as symbols of cheap energy, anti-globalism and opposition to military escalation.
This combination allows the AfD to speak to different parts of its electorate without presenting a single, fully developed foreign-policy doctrine. Supporters may hear one message about defending German sovereignty from Washington, another about restoring trade with Moscow and a third about resisting European Union policy. Each message reinforces the broader claim that traditional parties have sacrificed German interests to international institutions.
The danger for the AfD is that these positions may conflict once the party is forced to govern. A government that seeks US security guarantees, NATO protection and access to American markets cannot treat Washington solely as an external power whose interests are separate from Germany’s. Similarly, restoring Russian gas supplies would depend on security conditions, sanctions policy and Moscow’s willingness to resume commercial relations.
State government would also impose practical limits. An AfD administration in Saxony-Anhalt could influence education, policing, asylum implementation and cultural institutions, but it would not control Germany’s defence policy or determine its national position on NATO and Ukraine. The party’s foreign-policy message would therefore initially be more symbolic than operational.
Nevertheless, symbolism matters. A governing AfD state could use official visits, education programmes, cultural exchanges and public statements to normalise closer ties with Russia. It could also challenge federal policies through the Bundesrat, Germany’s upper house, where state governments participate in national legislation.
Human Rights and the Domestic Testing Ground
The AfD’s foreign-policy posture cannot be separated from its domestic agenda. The party has campaigned for strict immigration controls, mass deportations and what it calls “remigration.” Its policies reportedly include stronger detention measures, restrictions on asylum rights and separate schooling for refugee children.
Ulrich Siegmund has described his priorities as
“the deportation of people who are illegal, a deportation offensive and above all dropping the incentives for why people come here and exploit our social system.”
The language presents migration primarily as a security and welfare issue, while critics warn that its implementation could threaten asylum protections and broader Human Rights standards.
An AfD government would likely focus first on cultural and institutional measures that can be implemented at state level. Grégoire Roos of Chatham House described such a government as a “laboratory” for national ambitions. That laboratory could include changes to school curricula, flags, history teaching, inclusion policies, refugee education and public broadcasting.
These issues are important because state governments possess substantial influence over education and policing. An AfD administration could use those powers to challenge what it calls “woke” ideology and to redefine the relationship between the state, migrants and minority communities.
The party has also proposed withdrawing Saxony-Anhalt from the regional public broadcaster, arguing that it spreads disinformation. Such a move would deepen the conflict between the AfD and Germany’s established media and democratic institutions.
The Firewall Under Pressure
Chancellor Friedrich Merz has warned that an AfD victory would create “significant problems” for Saxony-Anhalt and promised to do
“everything we can to prevent Saxony-Anhalt falling to extremists.”
He has also restated the CDU’s refusal to cooperate with the AfD:
“Cooperation between my party and this party and its officials is not possible. There can be no compromises.”
The firewall is intended to prevent the AfD from gaining executive legitimacy through coalitions or parliamentary deals. But its political effectiveness becomes more difficult to sustain as the party’s vote share rises. If the AfD wins more than 40% while the CDU, SPD and Greens remain weak, excluding it may require an unstable coalition of ideologically opposed parties.
Boris Pistorius of the SPD and Baden-Württemberg Premier Cem Özdemir of the Greens have called for swift action to ban the most radical AfD state branches in Thuringia, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Brandenburg. Former Chancellor Angela Merkel has urged citizens to “stand up” for democracy.
These reactions reflect Germany’s model of “militant democracy,” under which the state may restrict or ban organisations judged to threaten the constitutional order. But a ban would be legally complex and politically controversial, especially when the party enjoys support from a large share of voters.
The firewall can prevent cooperation, but it cannot remove the social and economic grievances that have enabled the AfD’s rise. Its survival will depend on whether mainstream parties can address migration, energy prices, regional inequality and distrust in government without adopting the AfD’s most divisive positions.
What an AfD Breakthrough Would Mean
An outright AfD majority would have three immediate effects. First, it would give the party an unprecedented governing foothold. Second, it would provide an opportunity to test its domestic programme. Third, it would transform a previously theoretical debate about far-right government into a practical question of institutional power.
If the AfD falls short of a majority, other parties may still block it by forming a broad coalition. However, such an arrangement could be fragile and could reinforce the AfD’s argument that established parties are willing to abandon ideological differences solely to exclude it.
For Germany’s foreign policy, the immediate impact would be limited because state governments do not control diplomacy, the armed forces or national sanctions policy. The political consequences would nevertheless be substantial. A state government could amplify anti-Ukraine positions, challenge federal policy through the Bundesrat and make closer relations with Russia part of the normal political debate.
The election could also influence the next round of state contests, particularly in eastern Germany. A strong AfD performance in Saxony-Anhalt would demonstrate that the party can convert protest support into governing authority. That would strengthen its campaign to present itself as a credible alternative for the 2029 federal election.
The AfD’s foreign-policy balancing act is not a simple choice between Trump and Putin. It is an attempt to use both figures—and the political movements associated with them—to advance a German nationalist project.
Trump offers a model of aggressive border politics, executive authority and resistance to liberal internationalism. Putin represents the possibility of restored energy ties, opposition to sanctions and a challenge to Germany’s postwar alignment with the United States and the European Union. The AfD selectively embraces each while insisting that Germany must remain loyal only to its own interests.
That strategy may be electorally effective, particularly in regions affected by economic insecurity, migration concerns and frustration with the Ukraine war. But governing would expose its contradictions. Germany cannot easily combine reliance on American security, opposition to NATO policy, economic dependence on global trade and a return to Russian energy without making difficult choices.
Saxony-Anhalt is therefore more than a regional election. It is a test of whether the AfD can turn nationalist messaging into a coherent programme of government—and whether Germany’s democratic institutions can defend the firewall while addressing the conditions that made the party’s rise possible.